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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Todd appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon his plea of
guilty to felony grand theft by false pretenses and/or embezzlement.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Over a period of about three years, Todd stole at least $57,000.00 from
his employer. (PSI, pp.2, 11-12. 1) Working as a hotel manager, Todd deposited
into his personal account funds paid by customers for stays at the hotel.

(Id.)

The hotel owner also put Todd in charge of renting out another property and
Todd collected a tenant's rent payment for himself, but told the owner he could
not find a renter. (Id.)
The state filed an information charging Todd with felony grand theft by
false pretenses and/or embezzlement, in violation of Idaho Code §§ 182403(1 )(2)(b) and 18-2407(1)(b). (R., pp.27-29.) Todd pied guilty and completed
a presentence investigation.
Plea Tr. and PSI.)

(R., pp.36-43; see generally, 11/6/07 Change of

The district court entered Judgment, imposed a unified

sentence of twelve years with four years fixed and ordered restitution in the
amount of $57,083.96. (R., pp.44-55, 57-58; 1/7/08 Sentencing Tr., hereinafter
"1/7/08 Tr.," p.54, Ls.21-22, p.61, Ls.7-13.) Todd timely appealed. (R., pp.5962.)
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Pages of attachments to the PSI are numbered sequentially to the PSI pages.
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ISSUES

Todd states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Were Mr. Todd's rights under both the Due Process Clause
and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
violated when the district court based its decision to impose
a long prison sentence upon Mr. Todd based in part on his
inability to pay the restitution actually imposed?

2.

Alternatively, did the district court abuse its discretion by
imposing a unified sentence of twelve years, with four years
fixed, upon Mr. Todd based on his indigency [sic] and by
failing to consider the mitigating factors present in his case?

(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Todd failed to preserve his violation of due process claims for appeal,
and, even if his claims are properly before this court, has Todd failed to
establish that the district court violated those rights when it imposed a
prison sentence upon him?

2.

Has Todd failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion
when it imposed a twelve year sentence with four years fixed upon Todd's
plea of guilty to grand theft by false pretenses and/or embezzlement?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Todd Failed To Preserve His Violation Of Due Process Claims For Appeal And
Even If His Claims Are Properly Before This Court, The District Court Did Not
Violate Those Rights When It Imposed A Prison Sentence Upon Him

A.

Introduction
Todd asserts that his "rights under both the Due Process Clause and the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were [violated] when the
district court imposed a lengthy prison sentence almost entirely based upon his
indigent status." (Appellant"s brief, pp.11.) Todd's claims fail because he failed
to preserve his due process claims for appeal, and the district court appropriately
imposed sentence based upon the criteria found in I.C. § 19-2526.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues such

as a claimed due process violation is one of deference to factual findings, unless
they are clearly erroneous, but free review of whether constitutional requirements
have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375,
380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003).

C.

Todd Failed To Preserve His Violation Of Due Process Claims For Appeal
For the first time on appeal, Todd claims that "the district court violated

[his] rights under both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment" when it "imposed a lengthy prison sentence,
based 'heavily' on [Todd's] inability to pay restitution."
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(Appellant"s brief, p.4.)

Todd acknowledges that he "did not object to . . . the district court's oral
statements that it was going to 'heavily' consider [Todd's] indigent status in
imposing a stiff prison sentence." (Appellant's brief, pp.5-6.) "It is a fundamental
tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must be made in the trial
court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389,
398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). "Issues not raised before the trial court may
not be considered for the first time on appeal." State v. Adams, 138 Idaho 624,
628, 67 P.3d 103, 107 (Ct. App. 2003). As such, Todd's claims are not properly
before this court.
An unpreserved issue may be raised for the first time on appeal if the error
claimed is fundamental. State v. McAway, 127 Idaho 54, 60, 896 P.2d 962, 968
(1995); State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992).
Fundamental error has been defined as one that "goes to the foundation or basis
of a defendant's rights or must go to the foundation of the case or take from the
defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no court could or
ought to permit him to waive." State

v. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 916, 918, 854 P.2d

259, 261 (1993). An error is fundamental when it so profoundly distorts the
proceedings that it "produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his
fundamental right to due process." State v. Mccutcheon, 129 Idaho 168, 169,
922 P.2d 1094, 1095 (Ct. App 1996) (citing Lavy, 121 Idaho at 844, 828 P.2d at
873; State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178,180,824 P.2d 109,111 (1991)).
Before the appellate court will engage in a fundamental error analysis, the
appellant must establish that the trial court committed an error.
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State v.

Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007). Todd has failed to
show fundamental error justifying appellate review.

Todd asks this Court to

review his claim under the fundamental error doctrine, arguing that the district
deprived him of due process by considering, for sentencing purposes, Todd's
ablility to compensate the victim for losses Todd inflicted. (Appellant's brief,
pp.5-6.) Todd has not cited a single case prohibiting a sentencing court from
considering a defendant's ability to pay restitution when that court imposes
sentence. Idaho Code§ 19-2526 sets forth certain criteria a court may consider
for sentencing purposes; Todd has not challenged the constitutionality of this
statute either. As explained more fully below in subsection D., the district court's
application of this statutorily authorized sentencing factor when imposing
sentence upon Todd was not an error, much less a fundamental error.

D.

Even If Todd's Claims Are Properly Before This Court, The District Court
Did Not Violate Todd's Due Process Rights When It Imposed Sentence
A sentencing court's decision between imprisonment and probation is one

of discretion. State v. Hathaway, 111 Idaho 844, 727 P.2d 1272 (Ct App. 1986).
Idaho Code § 18-2526 provides a sentencing court with certain criteria to
consider when making this decision. The payment of, or ability to pay restitution
is but one ground a sentencing court may weigh in favor of probation:
(2)
The following grounds, while not controlling the
discretion of the court, shall be accorded weight in favor of
avoiding a sentence of imprisonment:
(f) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the
victim of his criminal conduct for the damage or injury that was
sustained; provided, however, nothing in this section shall prevent
the appropriate use of imprisonment and restitution in combination.
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I.C. § 19-2526 (2)(f).

Todd claims the district court violated his due process

rights by considering Todd's ability to pay restitution when it imposed sentence, a
consideration, as stated above, that is specifically authorized by statute. Todd,
however, does not even address or challenge the constitutionality of Idaho's
sentencing statute.
Instead, Todd's claim relies upon U.S Supreme Court and Idaho case law
that is either inapplicable or not on point. (See, Appellant's brief, pp.4-11.) None
of the cases Todd cites address whether or not a sentencing court may consider
a defendant's inability to pay restitution at the time it initially imposes sentence.
For example, in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), the defendant had
already been granted probation.

The issue was whether probation could be

revoked for failure to pay a fine or restitution.

kl

at 665; see also, State v.

Braaten, 144 Idaho 606, 167 P.3d 357 (Ct. App. 2007).

The Beardon Court

explained the general rule concerning imprisonment of a defendant based only
upon indigency:
The rule of Williams2 and Tate 3 , then, is that the State
cannot "impos[e] a fine as a sentence and then automatically
conver[t] it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent
and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full." In other words, if the
State determines a fine or restitution to be the appropriate and
adequate penalty for the crime, it may not thereafter imprison a
person solely because he lacked the resources to pay it.

2

Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (holding that a state cannot imprison
indigent defendants beyond the statutory maximum based solely their inability to
ray a fine).
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (holding that a state cannot convert a fine
imposed under a fine-only statute into a jail term based solely on an indigent
defendant's inability to pay a fine in full).
6

461 U.S. at 667-68 (internal citations omitted). Here, the sentencing court did not
impose restitution then convert it to a prison term because Todd could not pay
the restitution. The court ordered restitution and specifically declined imposing a
fine along with imposing a term of incarceration. (R., pp.44-55, 57-58; 1/7/08 Tr.,
p.61, Ls.7-13.) The court did not even impose the maximum term of confinement
for Todd's crime. 4 Also of note is the fact that Todd actually stipulated to the
restitution order at sentencing. (R., p.56; 1/7/08 Tr., p.54, Ls.12-20.)
When the court sentenced Todd, it determined that probation and
restitution were not adequate penalties for the crime. Instead, the district court
appropriately examined the sentencing criteria laid out in I.C. § 19-2526. The
court considered Todd's prior similar offenses, "there's two prior felonies for
taking other people's property, checks, paper, that type of thing."

(1/7/08 Tr.,

p.58, Ls.14-15.) The court noted that in terms of deterrence, Todd had "already
been in prison for [theft]" (1/7/08 Tr., p.58, L.16), and "[the crime] didn't stop
because Mr. Todd stopped it.

It stopped because he got caught ... there's

nothing to indicate that Mr. Todd would have stopped this on his own." (1/7/08
Tr., p.58, Ls19-22).

In addition, the court addressed the need to deter and

protect the public from this type of crime, stating, "you can't let people embezzle
$57,000 from a local business and walk away and give them probation" (1/7/08
Tr., p.60, Ls.10-11 ), and "I can't look at the citizens of this county and say that's

4

I.C. § 18-2408(2)(a) provides that theft by false pretenses and/or embezzlement
is "punishable by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or
imprisonment ... for not less than one (1) year nor more than fourteen (14)
years, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
7

okay, probation is okay. I can't do it. I owe the public [and the victim] that much .
. . it requires a prison sentence" (1/7/08 Tr., p.60, L.25 - p.61, L.3.)
The district court did not violate Todd's due process rights when it
considered the sentencing criteria found in I.C. § 19-2526 and exercised its
discretion by imposing a prison sentence instead of placing Todd on probation.
As such, this Court should affirm the district court's judgment and sentence.

11.
Todd Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
When It Imposed A Twelve Year Sentence With Four Years Fixed Upon His Plea
Of Guilty To Felony Grand Theft By False Pretenses And/Or Embezzlement

A.

Introduction
Todd argues in the alternative that the district court abused its sentencing

discretion by "imposing a lengthy sentence based on his indigent status"
(Appellant's brief p.12), and failing to adequately consider mitigating factors,
including his remorse and "acceptance of responsibility for his criminal behavior"
(Id.} along with the age of Todd's prior convictions for theft (Id., at pp.13-14).
Considering any view of the facts, Todd has failed to establish that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing four years fixed for felony grand theft by
false pretenses and/or embezzlement.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a defendant alleges an excessive sentence on appeal the appellate

court conducts an independent review of the record that considers the nature of
the offense, the defendant's character and protection of society. State v. Reinke,
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103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). "Absent a showing of
a clear abuse of discretion, a sentence within statutory limits will not be disturbed
on appeal." State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 604, 768 P.2d 1331, 1337 (1989).
C.

The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Imposing A Twelve Year
Sentence With Four Years Fixed Upon Todd's Guilty Plea To Felony
Grand Theft By False Pretenses And/Or Embezzlement
To determine whether the trial court abused its sentencing discretion, an

appellate court independently reviews "all of the facts and circumstances of the
case," including the record, and considers the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender. State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 500, 129 P.3d 1241,
1249 (2006). To prevail, the appellant must establish that, under any reasonable
view of the facts, the sentence is excessive considering the objectives of criminal
punishment. State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005).
Those objectives are "(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual
and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing." State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 671, 978 P.2d 227,
231 (1999) (internal citations omitted).
Todd argues that the district court abused its sentencing discretion not
only by violating Todd's due process rights, but also by not adequately
considering the age of his criminal history, his acceptance of responsibility and
remorse for his actions. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-14.) While Todd's arguments
may have some relevancy to sentencing, a sentencing court is not required to
assess or balance all of the sentencing goals in an equal manner.
Dushkin, 124 Idaho 184, 186, 857 P.2d 663,665 (Ct. App. 1993).
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State v.

Although Todd's prior offenses occurred in the late 1970s through the mid1980s, those crimes are very similar to the one at hand. (PSI, pp.3-4, 8.) Todd's
prior convictions involved stealing and depositing a check that belonged to his
employer, keeping rent money for himself while working for an apartment
complex, and passing bad checks. (PSI, pp.4, 8.) Todd violated probation in the
bad check case by committing a new felony theft, then later violated parole by
not reporting to his parole officer. (Id.) Here, over a period of three years, Todd
deposited checks made out to his employer into his personal account.

(PSI,

pp.2, 11-12.) During this time Todd also kept rent money he collected on a
property owned by his employer, while claiming he had not been able to rent the
property. (Id.)
Although Todd eventually claimed to have accepted responsibility and
expressed remorse for his actions, when first confronted with his crime, Todd
"stated he had inadvertently deposited a check belonging to [his employer] into
his personal account." (PSI, p.2.) "[Todd] claimed he had not intended to steal
the check, and that it was purely accidental."

(PSI, p.11.)

In terms of

rehabilitation or restitution, the district court correctly pointed out:
[T]his isn't a case where [Todd] is a welder or a car mechanic or
he does something that doesn't involve handling money. He's a
hotel manager by profession, and in order to be employed in a
good paying capacity it would probably require him to be in a
position of trust, which with three felonies I can't see that
happening.
(1/7/08 Tr., p.57, L.22 - p.58, L.3.) Todd's prior criminal history, his past failures
at probation and parole, combined with the nature of all his crimes, call for
incarceration instead of probation in order to fulfill the sentencing goals of
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deterring Todd from re-offending, deterring others from this type of crime, and
protecting society. Todd has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The State respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and
sentence.
DATED this 10th day of December 2008.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 10th day of December 2008, served
a true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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